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The allocation of capital and relevant institutions are critical determinants of economic 
performance, but cross-country research is complicated by the significance of economic 
development. We derive a method where this is not the case. 
 
Econometric Model  
 
To  estimate  the  functional  efficiency  of  capital  allocation
1,  Wurgler  (2000)  estimates 
industry  elasticity  of  investments  with  respect  to  industry  value-added.  Mueller  and 
Reardon  (1993)  do  this  by  estimating  Marginal  q,  which  measures  the  return  on 
investments relative to opportunity cost (see Gugler et al., 2004). The use of Marginal q 
is consistent with conventional investment theory, but Wurgler’s measure is not
2. 
 
To measure capital allocation at the firm level, we modify Wurgler (2000) to make the 
method consistent with the accelerator principle and investment theory. To do this, we 
measure  elasticity  of  capital  with  respect  to  output,  measured  as  sales.  Assuming 
constant  prices,  changes  in  sales  will  be  proportional  to  changes  in  output.  Ceteris 
paribus,  higher  elasticity  of  capital  with  respect  to  sales  means  quicker  response  to 
changes in expected returns and therefore, more efficient capital allocation.  
 
                                                 
1 Tobin (1984). 
2 Wurgler (2000) estimates elasticity of investments with respect to value added, η ,  






















, where I is industry investments (gross fixed capital formulation) and V 
is value added. Presumably he does this for empirical reasons, since he uses aggregated industry data.  
However, one may still expect a high correlation between η  and λ
*.  For elasticity of capital to equal 
elasticity of investments, it is necessary that t t I K ∆ = ∆
∗ . This happens only if  1 1 − − = t t K I δ which implies 
that 1 1 −
∗
















, where Mt 
and It is market value and investments respectively.    3 
The accelerator model of investments captures time structure and responses to changes in 
expectations. Several proxies can be used as accelerators
3. We choose sales because of 
inconsistent measurements of value-added across industries and countries
4.  
 
In accelerator models, the desired level of capital,
∗
t K  is determined by output, Yt: 
 
t t kY K =
*                   (1) 
 
where k is the capital coefficient (capital-output ratio)
5. We assume 
∗
t K  to equal to actual 
capital, Kt. This means net investments, It and (Kt - Kt-1), are proportional to changes in 
desired stock of capital, 
∗
−
∗ − 1 t t K K . Net investments, NIt, is expressed:  
 
) ( 1 − − = t t t Y Y NI λ                 (2) 
 
Net  investments  are  proportional  to  an  accelerator  λ.  If  t t K K =
∗   then  λ  =  k.  This 
equilibrium  assumption  is  typically  unfulfilled,  but  not  relevant  here
6.  For  gross 
investments,  we  add  replacement  investments  which  are  proportional  to  old  capital, 
1 − t K δ :  
 
t t t Y K I ∆ + = − λ δ 1                 (3) 
 
We divide both sides with Kt-1: 
 











λ δ                   (4) 
                                                 
3 Tinbergen (1938, 1939), Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), Kuh (1963) and Jorgenson (1971). 
4 Value-added is calculated in two ways: 1) Sales – costs for intermediary goods, 2) Profit + cost of labor. 
Sales are relatively unproblematic but costs of intermediary goods and labor are counted differently across 
countries.  
5 Kaldor (1963) argues this ratio is stable over time.       
6 If fulfilled, there would be efficient allocation all the time, with an elasticity of one. See Jorgenson (1971) 
and Tinbergen (1938).   4 
 
Since  t t kY K =















λ δ                 (5) 
 
where λ
* = (λ/k), which is elasticity of capital with respect to output (sales). This is 
additionally useful because it achieves a normalization that reduces heteroskedasticity, 
making equation 4 possible to estimate. Note that if  t t K K =
∗ at every point in time, then λ 
= k, which means λ
* = 1.  
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where 
∗ λ  is elasticity of investments with respect to sales, I is investments made by firm i 
in period t, K is capital stock in period t-1 and S is sales in period t. 
 
Cross-country  panel  studies  are  interested  in  country-specific  estimations  of  capital 




We  use  firm-level  accounting  data  from  Standard  &  Poor’s  Compustat  Global  to 
measure gross investments: 
 
I = After tax profit – dividends + depreciation + ∆Equity + ∆Debt + R&D   
   5 
This adequately reflects actual investments. Using gross investments is more appropriate 
than net investments because it is not possible to obtain reliable estimates for replacement 
investments.  Although  advertising  and  marketing  should  arguably  be  included  in 
investments (Mueller and Reardon, 1993), we exclude them because of inconsistently 
available across countries. Financial firms are excluded from the sample. 
 
The  measure  of  capital  is  selected  to  be  consistent  across  countries.  Variables  are 
adjusted to 2000 constant prices with inflation data from International Financial Statistics 
(IMF). A total of 11984 included firms yield 61292 observations across 44 countries. To 
minimize the weight of outliers, observations for each country are cut five percent at each 
end of the distribution. In Table 1, we group countries by legal origin (see La Porta et al., 
2003).   
 
We  use  the  following  explanatory  variables:  Property  rights  (Holmes  et  al,  1997); 
Minority shareholder protection (Pagano and Volpin, 2005
7); Law and order (averaged 
for 1982-1995, from International Country Risk Guide); Ownership concentration (La 
Porta  et  al,  1998);  Family  ownership  concentration  (La  Porta  et  al,  1999
8).  We  add 
dummies for legal origins (La Porta et al., 2003) classified as English, German, French, 
Scandinavian  and  Socialist/Communist.  We  use  standard  controls  for  economic 
development as logarithm of 1995 GDP and economic growth as average GDP growth 





We compare our measure with estimates of marginal q by Gugler et al (2004) and find no 
significant correlation. However, marginal q is significantly correlated with ownership 
concentration,  property  rights  and  shareholder  protection.  The  merit  of  our  model  is 
reflected in Table 2. When we regress Wurgler’s elasticity estimates on our measure of 
elasticity, the coefficient is close to one (Table 3). The interesting comparison between 
                                                 
7 This is an extended version of La Porta et al (1998), also called the LLSV Pagano-Volpin anti-director 
index. It covers 1993 to 2001; we use the average. 
8 This is measured as control rights, not cash-flow rights. Data for Indonesia, Philippines, Taiwan and 
Thailand is from Claessens et al (2000). 
9 Data for both is from World Development Indicators; data for Taiwan is from La Porta et al. (1997).   6 
Wurgler (2000) and our measure is the correlation with control variables. GDP growth is 
significant and negatively correlated with both our measure (-0.34) and Wurgler (-0.4). 
However, current GDP is positively and significantly correlated with Wurgler’s measure 
(0.44)  but  not  our  measure.  This  suggests  our  measure  is  not  sensitive  to  economic 
development but is sensitive to economic growth. This makes it robust for cross-country 
study. 
 
Results for legal origin do not support the legal origins hypothesis (La Porta et al., 1998). 
We  find  weak  protection  of  property  combined  with  high  ownership  concentration, 
particularly family, appear to hamper capital allocation. Property rights and law and order 
have a positive and significant correlation (at the 5% level) with elasticity. 
 
There are several explanations for capital elasticity greater than one. First, indivisibilities 
of production factors may make the production function discontinuous, so output cannot 
be  produced  proportionally  to  capital.  Second,  “excessive  expectations”  may  affect 
estimates (Manne, 1945). Third, if It or Kt contain measurement errors, this can create 
scaling  effects  so  estimated  elasticity  deviates  from  its  true  value.  However,  this  is 
unlikely to be problematic here since variables were chosen for consistent cross-country 
estimation. This is why we use sales to measure output. Any measurement error will be 
consistent  across  all  countries,  since  elasticity  is  a  relative  measure  of  efficiency  of 
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Table 1   Capital elasticities with respect to Sales, 
∗
j λ ˆ  
Country  ∗
j λ ˆ   t-value  Std. Err.  R

















Canada  0.849  15.0  0.057  0.14  303  1646  1999-2005 
Hong Kong  0.756  8.24  0.092  0.12  101  550  1999-2005 
India  0.687  13.6  0.051  0.17  169  912  1999-2005 
Ireland  1.464  6.99  0.210  0.26  33  178  1999-2005 
Israel  0.609  2.05  0.297  0.06  26  140  1999-2005 
Malaysia  0.400  16.4  0.024  0.15  524  2371  1999-2005 
New Zealand  0.829  3.02  0.275  0.07  52  234  2000-2005 
Pakistan  0.367  3.09  0.119  0.12  26  164  1998-2005 
Singapore  0.776  18.9  0.041  0.25  301  1363  2000-2005 
South Africa  1.064  6.26  0.170  0.09  114  512  2000-2005 
Thailand   0.523  9.91  0.053  0.13  217  1182  1999-2005 
United Kingdom  1.276  18.8  0.068  0.09  691  3774  1999-2005 
United States  1.160  42.5  0.027  0.16  2137  11642  1999-2005 






54.7  0.016  0.11  5071  26715  - 
Argentina  0.600  7.73  0.078  0.37  21  114  1999-2005 
Belgium  1.266  8.05  0.157  0.18  72  400  1999-2005 
Brazil   0.551  8.41  0.066  0.15  96  524  1999-2005 
Chile  0.431  7.96  0.054  0.20  80  438  1999-2005 
Colombia  0.283  1.88  0.151  0.13  10  54  1999-2005 
France  1.575  14.8  0.106  0.10  362  1976  1999-2005 
Greece  1.034  9.96  0.104  0.27  55  296  1999-2005 
Indonesia  0.342  4.92  0.069  0.07  170  764  1999-2005 
Italy  0.937  8.14  0.115  0.11  160  738  2000-2005 
Mexico  0.715  8.58  0.083  0.31  57  308  1999-2005 
The Netherlands  1.595  11.2  0.142  0.15  113  620  1999-2005 
Peru  0.675  8.89  0.075  0.44  18  123  1997-2005 
The Philippines  0.645  12.8  0.050  0.31  69  373  1999-2005 
Portugal  1.219  6.62  0.184  0.30  26  140  1999-2005 
Spain  0.942  11.8  0.080  0.25  76  410  1999-2005 
Turkey  0.567  2.53  0.224  0.06  29  156  1999-2005 






27.6  0.042  0.10  1414  7434  - 
Austria  1.167  7.47  0.156  0.25  43  248  1999-2005 
Germany  1.579  18.7  0.085  0.12  431  2344  1999-2005 
Japan  0.603  38.5  0.016  0.24  2860  13230  2000-2005 
South Korea   0.817  21.4  0.038  0.35  203  927  2000-2005 
Switzerland  0.946  12.6  0.075  0.21  142  782  1999-2005 
Taiwan  0.725  16.0  0.045  0.26  180  972  1999-2005 






48.6  0.023  0.13  3859  18503  - 
Denmark  0.977  7.08  0.138  0.12  86  470  1999-2005 
Finland  1.619  9.21  0.176  0.20  84  454  1999-2005 
Norway  2.340  5.38  0.435  0.07  89  404  2000-2005 
Sweden  1.177  6.91  0.170  0.05  173  961  1999-2005 






11.2  0.115  0.06  432  2289  - 
China  0.482  30.5  0.016  0.21  1130  6108  1999-2005 
Hungary  0.730  4.41  0.165  0.29  11  60  1999-2005 
Poland  1.331  5.88  0.227  0.29  19  119  1998-2005 
Russia  0.434  3.42  0.127  0.36  12  64  1999-2005 







31.2  0.016  0.20  1172  6351  - 
Average / total
a  0.914 
(0.902) 
 
77.5  0.012  0.10  11948  61292  - 
a These are weighted averages. Note that this gives different weights to countries. Simple averages  ∗
j λ ˆ are in brackets.   9 
Table 2  Correlation Matrix 
  ∗
























j λ ˆ  
  
  1                     
Ownership (mean)  - 0.27    1                   
Ownership (median)  - 0.32    0.96    1                 
Family ownership (10%)  - 0.48*    0.53*    0.59*    1               
Family ownership (20%)  - 0.49*    0.54*    0.57*    0.95*    1             
Property rights    0.43*  - 0.51*  - 0.55  - 0.60*  - 0.61*    1           
shareholder protection  - 0.20  - 0.21  - 0.20  - 0.30  - 0.29  - 0.10    1         
Law and order    0.61*  - 0.44*  - 0.46*  - 0.54*  - 0.61*    0.74*  - 0.17    1       
Log GDP    0.16  - 0.54*  - 0.54*  - 0.34  - 0.38*    0.19  - 0.02    0.41*    1     
GDP growth  - 0.34*  - 0.26  - 0.22    0.27    0.30    0.17    0.10  - 0.17    0.03    1   
Marginal q, qm     0.12  - 0.40*  - 0.47*  - 0.19  - 0.17    0.44*    0.33*    0.24    0.28    0.28    1 
j η ˆ     0.53*  - 0.32  - 0.34  - 0.38  - 0.50*    0.59*  - 0.03    0.71*    0.44*  - 0.48*  - 0.13 
Note: * indicates significance at 5 percent. j η ˆ is estimated by Wurgler  (2000). Marginal q from Gugler et al. (2004).  
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Table 3    Elasticity  of  capital,  elasticity  of 
investments and marginal q  
Explanatory variables:          Dependent variable: 
∗
j λ ˆ  













2  0.28  0.01 
No. observations  34  44 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is used as estimator.    